Playing Politics with Military Promotions
When personal preference trumps professionalism and merit, trust breaks down.
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE PETE HEGSETH removed nine Navy officers from a promotion list after they had already been selected by a board of senior admirals, according to a New York Times report, and on Tuesday the Wall Street Journal reported that he blocked nine Air Force officers for promotion and delayed dozens more. These reports follow an earlier controversy involving four Army officers who were reportedly removed from a list of colonels selected for promotion to brigadier general over the objection of both the Army’s then–chief of staff, Gen. Randy George, and the secretary of the Army, Dan Driscoll.
The immediate focus of each of these actions has been on the demographics of the officers involved—a disproportionate number of them have been black and/or female—but that’s not the only issue. It should concern Americans if the military’s most excellent officers are being sidelined in the name of fighting “DEI,” but it should also concern them that political leaders are beginning to substitute personal judgment for one of the most carefully designed and rigorously administered personnel systems in the federal government. At stake is trust in the military’s promotion system, an institution that has helped produce America’s senior military leaders for generations.
Most Americans trust that those chosen to lead the nation’s sons and daughters in peacetime and wartime have earned that responsibility through demonstrated competence, character, judgment, and performance. But few citizens—and frankly, even few who wear the uniform—understand how those selections are actually made. That lack of understanding makes the recent interventions by Secretary Hegseth especially troubling, because they involve a process specifically designed to insulate professional military advancement from politics while preserving appropriate civilian oversight.
As a general officer, I had the opportunity to both observe and participate in that process. During my career, I served on two boards considering colonels for promotion to brigadier general and one considering brigadier generals for promotion to major general. While I never sat on a Navy promotion board, the systems are remarkably similar in purpose, structure, rigor, and discipline. In fact, all our military services rely on large boards of senior leaders, extensive legal and procedural guidance, detailed personnel records, and collective professional judgment to identify officers with the greatest potential for strategic leadership. Before serving on those boards, I had little appreciation for the guidance, rigor, disciplined scoring, and meticulous deliberation involved in selecting roughly thirty new generals from hundreds of highly qualified colonels.
Contrary to what many Americans might assume, promotion boards are not informal discussions among senior leaders deciding which officers they happen to like and want to promote. The process is extraordinarily structured. Each board normally consists of eighteen senior officers—two-, three-, and four-star generals—who spend between ten and fourteen days reviewing the records of every eligible officer. It was among the most demanding administrative responsibilities I ever undertook because the consequences of those decisions would affect the military’s leadership for years to come.
Prior to reviewing a single file, board members receive extensive legal guidance, procedural instructions issued by their service secretary, and written direction concerning the needs of the service. Some of those requirements are dictated by law, particularly those stemming from the Goldwater–Nichols reforms of 1986. That legislation made joint-service experience a key factor in promotion to general and flag officer rank and eventually led to requirements for joint professional military education and qualifying joint assignments as prerequisites for senior military leadership. Other requirements involve successful performance in key developmental assignments, including command positions, critical staff assignments, and specialty jobs that demonstrate increasing responsibility throughout a career.
Additionally, the promotion system itself reflects Congress’s constitutional responsibilities under Article I of the Constitution. Congress is empowered to raise and support armies, provide and maintain a navy, and make rules governing the armed forces. Over time, Congress created a statutory framework intended to ensure that military promotions are based primarily on merit, performance, potential, and the needs of the service. Promotion boards are not simply an internal military tradition; they are part of a congressionally established personnel system designed to balance professional military judgment with civilian oversight.
During the review, each eligible Army colonel or Navy captain has his or her file examined by every member of the board. By the time an officer appears before a brigadier general selection board, the record under review often contains more than a quarter century of records including personnel evaluations, assignment and deployment history, educational accomplishments, awards, and other professional milestones. Board members review assessments written by immediate supervisors as well as evaluations from more senior leaders responsible for judging future potential. Those reports provide a detailed picture of how an officer has performed over an entire career, not simply during a single assignment or under a single commander. They also reflect what experienced leaders assessed as that officer’s capacity for higher responsibility.
Each board member independently evaluates each officer and assigns a numerical score, which they submit confidentially. Those scores are then compiled into an initial order-of-merit list reflecting the collective judgment of the entire board. Board members then spend additional hours examining officers above or near the selection line for specific qualifications, sharing professional observations and reviewing records in greater detail. If disciplinary information exists, it is carefully considered. If board members possess firsthand knowledge of an officer’s performance, leadership ability, character, or judgment, that information may also be discussed. The objective is not merely to identify officers who performed well in the past, but to determine which officers possess the judgment, intellect, character, and leadership ability required for strategic service in the future.
What impressed me most about sitting on these boards was the seriousness with which every member approached their responsibility. Nobody entered the room attempting to advance friends or settle scores. The process was designed specifically to minimize personal bias and maximize professional judgment. The resulting list reflected the collective assessment of eighteen experienced leaders from different Army specialties who understood the demands of military service, had experience leading large organizations, and recognized what successful strategic leadership requires.
Once completed, the promotion lists are forwarded through each service’s personnel system, reviewed by senior leaders, and ultimately provided to the service chief and the secretary of the army, navy, or air force. After that, the recommended personnel are passed to the secretary of defense, then to the president, and then to Congress for approval.
No human system is perfect, but after participating in those boards, I became convinced that the general and flag officer promotion process is among the fairest methods imaginable for selecting senior military leaders. More importantly, everyone in uniform trusts that promotions are based upon merit rather than personal preference. That trust is essential in a profession that asks people to devote years of their lives to service, often at great personal sacrifice. Officers accept the competitive nature of promotion because they believe excellence, performance, and potential will ultimately be recognized.
That is why the recent interventions by Secretary Hegseth are so concerning. To be clear, civilian oversight of the military is not only appropriate but essential. The secretary of defense has the legal authority to review promotion lists before they are forwarded for Senate confirmation. Historically, however, that authority has been exercised in limited circumstances involving new information about misconduct, ethical concerns, professional failings, or issues affecting an officer’s suitability for advancement. What has been far less common is removing officers who have already survived the board process without identifying any deficiencies in their qualifications, conduct, or performance.
Secretary Hegseth’s changes to the promotion lists appear to have occurred after the military’s professional selection process had already done exactly what Congress designed it to do. In the Army case, reports indicated that senior Army leaders strongly objected to the removal of officers from the promotion list. In the Navy case, the New York Times reported that nine officers selected by a board of senior admirals were removed after the board completed its work. The article further reported that several of those officers appeared to have been targeted because of prior participation in diversity-related activities years earlier in their careers, rather than because of any documented professional failing.
Secretary Hegseth, by rejecting the recommendations of promotion boards without stating his reasons, is effectively substituting his personal judgment for that of senior military leaders, the senior officer of the service, the service secretaries, and the institutional process established by Congress.
Congress created the promotion framework under its Article I authorities and established a process intended to ensure that professional military judgment would play the central role in identifying future senior leaders. Civilian leaders retain oversight and ultimate approval authority, but the system was designed to prevent arbitrary decision-making and to ensure that advancement rested primarily on demonstrated performance and potential. When names are removed without explanation after multiple layers of professional review have been completed, it raises legitimate questions about whether the intent of that system is being honored.
The damage from such interventions extends far beyond the officers directly affected. Less senior officers watching these events are unavoidably drawing conclusions about how the institution works. They are asking whether decades of strong performance still matter. They are wondering whether promotion boards remain the primary mechanism for advancement, or whether personal and political considerations now carry greater weight. Those questions strike at the heart of institutional trust because military professionals must believe that the standards applied to them are consistent, fair, and largely insulated from politics.
The question is not just whether Secretary Hegseth’s personnel decisions are motivated by racial and gender bias, but whether his decisions strengthen or weaken the trust that generations of military professionals have placed in a system designed to reward merit, character, and service.