A French Perspective

Welcome to Shield of the Republic. A podcast sponsored by the Bulwark and the Miller Center of Public Affairs at the University of Virginia, and dedicated to the proposition articulated by Walter Lipman during World War two. That a strong and balanced foreign policy is the necessary shield of our Democratic Republic. Eric Edelman, a Council at the Center Gegic and budgetary assessments, a Bulwark contributor and a non resident fellow at the Miller center. And I’m joined as always by my partner in all things having to do with strategy, grand, and less grand.

Elliott Cohen, the Robert E Ozgood professor of strategy at Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies in Washington, DC, and the Charlie Sykes Jared strategy at the Center for Strategic and International Studies. Elliott, how are you doing?

I’m doing just fine, Eric. You know, I’ve been thinking for some time that, you and I have talked an awful lot about Russia Ukraine. We’ve talked about, Israel Gaza more recently. We’ve been talking about China and strategic issues in the end of Pacific. We’ve talked about American, political dysfunction, but we haven’t been able to pull it all together.

So I think we should import some talent to enable us to do that. What do you say?

Funny that you should mention that. We have imported some talent to the United States from across the pond to do that. Because our very special guest on this seventy fifth episode of shield of the Republic, which is a bit of a milestone for us. Is Bruno Terre, the deputy director of the foundation for Strategic Research, one of France’s leading Think tanks. Bruno, who, in addition to being a a friend and longtime colleague of both, Elliott and mine, is, I think arguably the best exemplar in France of an intellectual style that I admire enormously because one of my intellectual heroes is the late Raymond Darron, and Bruno is a student of Pierre Hasner’s who was perhaps the greatest student of Ramon Dorrance, and I I think Pierre was also a student of Leo Strauss, so that is an incredible, at, you know, intellectual pedigree.

Bruno has worked at the NATO parliamentary assembly at Rand at the Ministry of Defense he’s been involved in, I think, every, French ministry of defense white paper for the, probably, the last twenty years. And is the author of more books than I can possibly recite in the time frame of our podcast, but most recently The author of La Guiller de Lageo Politique and the the war of the worlds, the return of geopolitics and the shock of empires. Bruno, welcome to shield of the Republic.

Hello. And thanks for hosting me.

Bruno, you your book really talks about what are the appropriate sort of analogies that people might think of to understand better our current geopolitical moment and you, talk about the pre world war one period. You talk about the inter war period. You talk about the period that, began the cold war. How would you characterize the kind of moment we’re in? Where does it fit into that larger sort of geostrategic and geopolitical picture?

Well, thanks, Eric. I think we have to go beyond the question. Is this a new cold war? Is this not a new cold war question that has kept many intellectuals busy, over the past ten years on both sides of the Atlantic. I think that what we are entering today, we, the Western world, but also the word at large, is something that has a little bit of the nineteen of the, nineteen tenths, the competition of empires, a little bit of the nineteen thirties, the the rise of authoritarian regime, but also a large bit of the early nineteen fifties.

That is the beginning of the new cohort. You know, in in other words, I think the twenty twenties are a little bit of the tenths, a little bit of the thirties, a little bit of the fifties. You know, each different historical era brings its own characteristics, but I think it’s not an artificial analogy to say that We have a little bit of the tense with the clash of empires with regional conflicts forecasting foreshadowing the great war. A little bit of the nineteen thirties because of successive aggressions by authoritarian regimes by revengeist regimes which refused, which refused to accept what they saw as the dominant Anglo Saxon powers, quote, and quotes, And we do have something that looks increasingly like the early fifties. I mean, Americans no, well, remember about the debate about Asia first, quote unquote, and should the US focus on Asia or on Europe, and many have said, I’m not the first one to say it, that maybe the war in Ukraine will be seen in retrospect as something again to what the Korean war was for the cold war that is a major bloody interstate conflict which was in a in a cell, in a sense, the introduction to the, multi decades call.

So that’s my long answer to to your simple question. A little bit of, three different, errors are good analogies to try to define the kind of, competition. What you in the US call the strategic competition, which which I think does not entirely capture, the era that is beginning now.

Bruno, the the thing that disturbs me a little bit about that is that first period ended up in World War one. That second period ended up in World War two. That third period nearly ended up in World War three. I mean, that do do you intend those analogies to be as menacing as, they, you know, as I think they are?

Well, first of all, idiot, I think these analogies are warnings. They should make us aware of the perils. That we’re going to face in the coming decades. But at the same time, we should be aware that there are, firebreaks or at least dampening mod dampening and moderating, instruments that did not exist. In the nineteen tenths and nineteen thirties.

And I I call them in French, the call, which is a rambling. I don’t know if you how you translate that into, English when you do mountaineering, something that prevents you from falling. One of them is obviously and it’s perhaps a dominant one. Nuclear deterrence. Nuclear deterrence is a very powerful instrument, probably the most important invention of nineteen forty five, maybe more important than the United Nation, it has worked remarkably well from that from my standpoint, but it’s once again something which did not exist in the, nineteen tenths, nineteen thirties.

There’s another moderating factor, which so far continues to exist, although it’s an open question whether it will still exist. In ten years from now is the fact that the economic interdependence between major pools of power is much more important than it was in the early part of the nineteenth century. Now I’m very well aware of that the old debate on whether or not inter economic interdependence helps preventing wars or whether it’s actually, not relevant. I think there is good scholarship to demonstrate that it does have some value. If that is correct, then given that we, the West, that is the United States, Europe and our East Asian partners are still going to be largely interdependent with China for a number of years even though we’re all decoupling, derisking, etcetera.

I think this goes fairly well for, for predicting or at least for for forecasting a limited chance, a very limited chance of a major conflicts in particular between the US and China, but also between the West and Russia in the coming years. So it’s a moderate optimism that I’m proposing here.

So so let me see if I can reduce that optimism just a little bit. You know, I I take your point about nuclear deterrence, but what strikes me is that whereas in the fifties, nuclear deterrence work to the benefit of the west. And when I say the west, basically, I’m including the liberal democracy. So I’m I am perhaps inappropriately, you know, using the west to include a, you know, Japan, South Korea, Australia, and so forth. It it it helped protect us, and it specifically helped protect Europe where, you know, the the conventional odds favored the Soviet Union.

If I look at where we are now, it seems to be nuclear deterrence is increasingly going to be used against us. I mean, it’ll be used against us. It has already been used against us by the Russians. I think, you know, Putin has been dangerously explicit about it, and I I would say recklessly so. The Chinese are in the middle of this very large expansion of their, nuclear arsenal, and that’s actually something we haven’t yet really explored in-depth on the podcast, Eric.

I think we probably should at some point. There’s a, I think, a very good chance that we’ll be looking at Iranian nuclear weapons which again, will be used to deter us. And what instead of nuclear deterrence, making the world you know, freeing us from the specter of conventional conflict, what nuclear deterrence may do is free them up to conduct war under, a certain pretty high threshold because it it deters Americans, maybe Asians as well.

Yeah. I think this is a good point, Eric, but, I have two comments on that. First of all, that when we refer to the early fifties, these were the early days of nuclear deterrence. We’ve had all learned a lot from what the possession of nuclear weapons brings or does not bring to the word order, I this may not be a very popular thesis, but I do think that even today nuclear weapons induce a sense of caution, of relative caution in the mindset of Russian, Chinese North Korean or Pakistan, leaders. But to go to your main point, it is true that nuclear weapons may prevent certain kinds of direct aggression, but, the, the effect cuts both ways, and it does enable countries which are protected by a nuclear umbrella to engage in limited aggression.

But that’s precisely my point. Even though it does help, you know, Russia to invade Ukraine because Ukraine was not protected by nuclear weapons, even though it does help China to project its power in the South China Sea in particular, it’s the fact remains that if nuclear, the basics of nuclear deterrent theory are correct, then it will equally prevent them from directly attacking countries which have nuclear weapons or which are protected. By nuclear weapons. So I do take your point, but I don’t think this negates the overall effect of the obsession of nuclear weapons, which not only play in their favor, does also continue to play in our favor. The fact is that no country endowed with nuclear weapons has ever embarked significant military aggression against a country which has nuclear weapons or is protected by nuclear weapons.

Although that, of course, is not the case for proxy conflicts on the periphery of the of the holdings of the major powers and one of the early, you know, in the late nineteen fifties. I know you know well, Bruno additions to the literature and thinking on, on nuclear deterrence was Glen Snyder’s notion of the stability instability paradox, which you were really in a in a sense, I think, adverting to, which is at the strategic level, we may not have to, worry too much about deterring an attack by the, PRC or Russia, with its nuclear arms against us. But in, places where, as you say, there’s not an extended deterrent guarantee or nuclear weapons present themselves, it becomes much more vague as in in the case of Ukraine or potentially in the case of, Taiwan or the South south China sea. And I think, you know, therein lies the concern that people have about, you know, this period that you describe. And I I wonder if you could, in particular, unpack one idea because you in introducing your in your book, the the, notion of the return of sort of these are my words, not yours, the sort of heartland rimland the geopolitical notion.

That is to say, continental land powers, which is the case with for most of our adversaries, Russia, China, Iran, as opposed to maritime powers on the periphery, which would include essentially the West and its allies in East Asia. How does that play into this kind of gray zone issue of of nuclear deterrence in your view.

Yes. Thanks. Before I get to that point, let me get, let me answer the your your first point. You’re absolutely right. We had Glen Slider in nineteen fifty nine, I think, or sixty one called the stability slash instability paradox is indeed what I was, hinting at when saying that nuclear weapons cut both ways.

They discourage open direct military conflict between countries who are protected. By nuclear weapons, but they do encourage to some extent indirect, conflict or conflict by proxies. And, you know, after all, this is a little bit what we’re seeing. I mean, this is not, this is not, entirely different from what we’re seeing in Ukraine today. But let me add something about deterrence.

Thiserence is not only, as we all know, it’s not only a new group. And I think there’s an additional factor that have not mentioned yet, which which is probably equally as important to, to, to reinforce my point that the that the, that the risk of direct conflict between, the west of its subsidiaries is limited. The United States and its allies have constructed, maintained, and reinforced and enlarge a unique system of mutual defense guarantees, which I think acts as an additional, deterrent beyond the, beyond the, the, the nuclear, beyond recruit returns itself. And I think that in today’s world, this is as important, maybe as nuclear weapons. Remember, since we mentioned Korea, Remember that, one of the reasons why Korea happened is that Dean HSN said very explicitly that career was not part of, the US defense perimeter.

So this was obviously a failure of deterrence. And I think the way we in the West and the US, in particular, manipulates deterrence today, much beyond the mere nuclear factor is extremely important in the way, our adversary will be encouraged or discouraged to, to go against us and all, allies. So my point here is that an additional dampening factor on the risk of major war is, our deterrents Bulwark of alliances and bases and partnerships which has no equivalent on the other side. This is why this is where, for instance, the analogy was the cold war becomes more, less relevant because they used to be roughly speaking two blocks with two systems of alliances, whereas today, I mean, the United States has two dozens of, of defense allies in the proper sense of the terms whereas, you know, China has only, has only one. And, that’s North Korea because on paper, there’s still an alliance between China and North Korea, And the Russian system itself is actually, being eroded by the day.

Russia is losing allies so that there’s an imbalance of, alliances, which is something pretty unique in which, and which limits the analogy with, the twenty twenty first, sorry, with the twentieth century. Now coming back to your main question, Yes. I do think when I talk about the return of job politics, it’s a very, you know, it’s it’s becoming a a a catch word that a lot of people are using, but I do mean it in the, literal historical sense of the term, we are witnessing the formation of what I call two families not two blocks, but two families of countries with one being Eurasian was the partnership between defense between, the defense partnership between China and Russia at its core, but also increasingly with Iran. Remember, you guys are experienced in seasons observers and policy makers. Remember, Yevgeny Bremerkov in the nineties, he was literally dreaming of a grand alliance.

This was during the Boris Yelton days, but Primarkov was openly dreaming of a new alliance between Russia, China, and Iran. And this is exactly what is, what is being formed today. So I call it the new league of the three emperors. But this is primarkoff’s dream coming true in a sense. And on the other side, you have a a liberal family.

The family of liberal democracy is very imperfect ones, but they’re like in in like in all families, you have, you know, the distant uncle or cousin that makes trouble. There’s the Hungarian one, the Turkish one. So these are families more than blocks, obviously. And at the core of the the new Western world, there is the Anglo Saxon, so to say, we we in France like to use the expression and this accent, I would say English speaking, English speaking family, which as has been the case for two centuries now, you know, is the core is the core of the west. So you have this two these two families and in between them, you have the the core, the the, the, the space of countries going from the Balkans to South China Sea which will the fate of which will largely determine the outcome of this new hybrid not so called but probably not hot war.

The choices which will be made in the coming decade by Turkey, by Iran, by India, you know, will India tilt towards the west or where it’s a multi ally, these countries, which are geographically in between the Eurasian family and the and the, and the liberal world, will determine for large, to a large extent, what’s the, what the outcome will be. But as ever, you know, as ever, the west will continue to be more an ID than a geographical expression. It starts to civilization in the in the cultural sense of the term. We we, I assume we, we, we consider it that, Japan and South Korea as as much part of the west as any other country. This is why I like to refer the West that say, you know, broadly speaking, the thirty eight countries of the OECD, that is, you know, democracies, which are develop countries and which are based on on the rule of law.

So let me if I could, I wanna push back to little bit on the nuclear question before we drop it, but then go to your, description of these two families, which I think is a wonderful way of putting it. And it’s, great overall picture. So just on the nuclear front, you know, I think it’s worth remembering that the Chinese attacked American forces in South Korea. It wasn’t just the issue wasn’t just deterring a North Korean invasion, but they actually attacked American forces when we had nukes and they didn’t. The Argentines attacked the Brits when the the Brits had nuclear weapons.

And I think perhaps most interestingly, the Egyptians and Syrians attack the Israelis when I think they would have had every reason to think that the Israelis had nuclear weapons. And so and and that last one, I I find particularly troubling because I think, you know, this won’t, oh, this is no longer just a question of the United States. Soviet Union or, I mean, Russia, China, and France and the UK. I mean, there are lots of other nuclear actors. For that matter, you could say, Pakistan attacked India.

We’ve had we have had war between between nuclear powers and the subcontinent. So, you know, I’m I I and I I wonder how that could spin out of control. So that was just a, you know, a, that’s the esprit deescalier as as we leave the nuclear question.

I’m I’m glad you’re asking this question. I’m actually just finishing another book in which I I take another look at these crises to see what you can actually establish as a real failure of nuclear deterrents or not. Well, let me take very briefly with these. Each of these four each of these four episodes. First of all, China attacking US force as well, you know, where US forces in Korea explicitly covered or even implicitly covered by the US nuclear deterrent, that was not obvious to the Chinese at the time.

And I’m not entirely certain that it was obvious to the Americans, to the Eisenhower, our administration in particular. So I’m not sure that your first example was a failure of nuclear deterrence.

It was technically a UN force. It still is.

By the way, absolutely. Absolutely. You’re absolutely right, idiot. There was technically a UN force. And last time I checked, the UN is not the nuclear power and, for good reasons, ice space.

Fotland’s Fotland’s This goes exactly to my to my point, actually. There was the f the falklands were not British territory. There was not a single indication in British policy discourse that, the falklands, a crown dependency was covered by nuclear by the British nuclear deterrent. So that’s That was irrelevant in a sense. Whether it was a failure of deterrence at large is another different question.

More relevant to the question I asked about, you know, when we try to exercise deterrence, we need to be very cautious about what we say. Outside the nuclear realm about the territories that are, you know, in our defense perimeter to use the words of DHS or not. The third example, Egypt and yom kippur war is is also a very interesting example. We now know that Anwar sadat, was very much aware of the nascent Israeli nuclear capability And it seems that he made a very conscious decision not to attack the core Israeli territory, the undisputed is really territory. So I don’t view this.

I don’t view nineteen seventy three as a fate of nuclear deterrence at all. I do actually view it as a testimony to a, to the fact that there was a learning curve in the release about these really nuclear deterrents, which started at that time. Finally, in the Pakistan. Now, when Pakistan, became a nuclear, well, tested nuclear weapons along with India in nineteen ninety eight, the feeling to be endowed with that nuclear umbrella irrespective of what exact pakistani and an Indian nuclear capabilities existed at the time was something which probably helped the Pakistan and military to make the decision to embark in a series of territory or encroachments in Kashmir and which ended up being that the the so called Cargillow War you know, analysts debate whether this should be called a war, whether, you know, the threshold for war is generally for political scientists, a thousand, combat deaths in a single year, but this was not undisputed pakistani or Indian territory. This was Khashmir, one of the most undisputed, or highly disputed, if you want, say, territories in Asia.

So, again, on this force example, I’m not sure you can, actually define it as a failure of concluded terms. And I think the jury’s still out on this one, but I do view it just like nineteen seventy three with an important milestone in the learning curve of nuclear deterrence in the in the Middle East, I think Charlie Sykes also a very important milestone in the learning curve, of, of nuclear science in in South Asia.

So so I’m certainly tempted to quibble with each of your responses to those cases, but but we’re gonna we’ll defer that to when you publish the next book and we’ll bring you back to podcast, and then we’ll we’ll, explore that. But I just wanna lay down a marker. I’m not sure I’ve I’m fully convinced. Anyway, set that aside. I I love, your that, you know, invoking the league of the, the three emperors.

And I I’ve find that very interesting because it seems to me you can make the case. The West has actually consolidated. It’s, or it’s increased its cohesion in the last decade or so. I think you see that in the end of Pacific, you certainly see it in, NATO. And that’s which is which is very much a good thing, even despite, you know, the Hungarian and now the Slovvox, doing what they do.

What what is more interesting to me is whether that grouping of those three countries with others on the periphery like North Korea, who knows, maybe Venezuela, something like that. Are they, How how how far can they come together? What are the things that kind of intrinsically pulled them apart And is there anything that the West can do to increase the divisions, or do you just have to kind of watch and hope that eventually, the those fissures will emerge, and then you benefit from them.

I think that the countries you’re referring to a more an access of convenience than anything else. These countries have common interest. Quite often they share a common word view, but, it’s clear that none of them wants to commit itself to the defense of another. I mean, Russia is certainly not interested in helping China in a war for Taiwan. And China even though it is supporting and will continue to support Russia and Ukraine does not want the people’s liberation army to intervene alongside, Ukraine, alongside Russia, even if the Russian territory, the internationally recognized Russian territory was actually, attacked.

So I don’t think this will ever morph into a real full fledged military alliance, a la an Atlantic alliance, so to say. But unfortunately, there’s not much we can do to split the map as separate. I think it’s a very western dream It’s a I call it the neo kissingerian dream, but, you know, I did people are using the, Nixon goes to China reference are, are doing it, so to say different different China, different Russia, different circumstances, different I mean, there’s so many differences that I don’t think the nineteen seventy two example is relevant for today. In fact, when people talk about and I’ve seen that in the United States, and I do see that in Europe, in particular, in France, where we have a very romantic view of Russia. At least many, many, officials and politicians have the belief that it’s in our power to split Russia from China or to avoid Russia falling into the embrace of China.

I think reflects a lot on, some kind of hubris. On our end. The belief that we are the only ones to influence to be able to influence the, the the great power relations and that and those, and those countries are not sovereign actors which make their own decisions. I mean, Putin has always said that he saw Russia as a Eurasian power. He has made a conscious choice already some long time ago way before Ukraine that he wanted to, to, to get closer to China.

Now, of course, the Ukraine war is bringing it even closer and probably a little too much. I mean, as Boris nemtsov said, long time ago, he predicted that Putin would, make Russia, a mining colony of of, of, of China. This is, you know, this is what what may happen. But my bottom line is that, the belief that we can, we, the West, the US, Europe, actually have the power to separate these two countries is something is is a strange form of hubris, I believe.

Let me pull on that thread a little bit. So China in your, you know, family of nations is a is a continental power, but the thing that’s given Americans the most pause has been the development of China’s maritime power, very large building up of the PLA Navy, the creation of military capabilities that make it very difficult for the US Navy, which is used to operating, pretty freely in the Western Pacific to do so without having to worry about, if there were a conflict about Chinese military capabilities. And and I take your point totally that, you know, it is the height of hubris for us to think that somehow we can, you know, peel Russia or China away from one another when they have, common interest, but it strikes me that their common interest is mostly negative, which is to say it’s an interest in thwarting what we’d like to call the rules based international order, but essentially what you were talking about, the the network of alliances that the US has built up, since the late nineteen forties, with its other allies, whether it’s the multinational alliance in Europe or the bilateral alliances we have, in the Indo Pacific and special relationships we’ve developed with countries, in the Middle East.

So it’s it’s largely a kind of negative interest that they share rather than a more positive interest. And to the degree that they are geographically contiguous, there is sort of, you know, an area in central Asia that is, you know, a little uncertain for both and a potential area of competition for both. And so while again, I don’t think that the West can, you know, can force this or make it happen by some kind of brilliant, kissingerian policy. It does strike me that we can try and push China in the direction more of of it’s continental interests, which will inevitably bring it into conflict with Russia, and create more conflict between the two. And that’s something you can do maybe at the margin, to try and relieve some of the other consequences of you know, of China’s, for instance, big maritime buildup.

Yeah. I think I see your point, Eric, and I, first of all, going to the going back to the question of the development of the Chinese Navy, I believe, I mean, you guys are great military analysts and you have know these things much better than I do correct me if I’m wrong, but I think the PLA now has more ships than the US Navy, which is something, you know. Yes. Definitely historical. Now I still think that it takes decades for country’s strategic culture or, strategic DNA to completely change.

I mean, China will not be a global maritime power anytime. So it’s probably going to get there or at least it’s getting in that direction, but it’s going to take them. So so that’s that’s my, first point. By the way, when one talks about, you know, a hypothetical conflict of war between, the United States and China, I think there are two dimensions that I always bring to the table. I’d be glad to have your reactions on that because you know much more, well, these things than I do that wants to remind people that the PLA has zero experience in combat, whereas the United States and the West has decades of constant, of constant engagement in major war for good or bad reasons, but that’s that that’s that’s irrelevant.

And two, that like most authoritarian states, China does not give a lot of leeway of margin of maneuver to it, to the lower echelons, which is something that may play out in some kind of of, when when the maneuver and the water does not go get into, does not go, exactly as planned as more wars do. This may have an impact. Although, you know, we can discuss that. You know, if how a Chinese military unit fights when he believes he’s fighting for his homeland. Yeah.

But but that these are two interesting, I think, indispensable dimension of looking at the scenario of a US China, US China war. Now your other point about these countries having moved a negative agenda in common. That is true but to a certain extent, only. I mean, let’s look at, for instance, the so called This information pack that appears to have been concluded between Moscow and Beijing, a couple of years ago, You know, this is obviously an area where there are many avenues of co of positive cooperation for them I don’t know to which extent this really to, this really translates into, concrete cooperation. But for them, it’s a positive, agenda.

Now your third point is an interesting one to reach. I’m not sure I have really an answer, but let me give you, let me let me actually illustrate your point. By saying that there are potentially two geographical areas where there are diverging interests between Mona Charen Beijing. One is Central Asia. The other is the high north.

Central Asia is the area where, just like Russian, Turkey in the Caucasus, it’s more a It should ideally be for both countries. It’s a condominium, but condominiums, you know, have a limited duration. So how long was well, this competition slash cooperation between the two countries, can last Can it actually sustain a growing differential of power between China and Russia? These are important questions, which I don’t have any immediate answers, but which lead me to to side with those who say that in the next twenty years, there may be as many avenues of disagreement and competition between the two than avenues of agreement and cooperation. The other is the high north.

Now, this is very interesting because, Should I start by saying that I don’t believe that the arctic is the new battle space and that, you know, countries the west China Russia will fight openly in the market. This is a horrible place to, to, to maneuver and, and to fight. However, however, Russia considers that the northern maritime route is actually its territory. It’s waters. Now if indeed in twenty years from now, probably not before.

It does become, nearly all year round an important, transit lane in particular for Chinese trade, then, you may have, you know, important disagreements between the two about who should control those men. By the way, this actually brings me to another point that I was trying to allude to earlier on about the future of economic interdependence. Will Saletan twenty years from now, China need to export as much as it as it does today to the west So that’s an open question. You know, I think economic interdependence fortunately or or unfortunately will stay with us for a long time that we can decouple the risk, and French shore, as you say, in the US, for some areas, but, you know, it’s we’re going not we’re not going to be completely decoupled from China for a very, long time. So my bottom line is that If that trade interdependence is maintained in twenty years from now, then it may, that it may lead to some frictions between Moscow and Beijing above the control and mastering of the Arctic, sea routes in the northern maritime route in particular.

You know, this is absolutely fascinating. We could go on to this vein for a while, but I was wondering if maybe we could zoom in a little bit and start with, start with France. I I have to say I have been baffled watching president Macron. Who is clearly a very smart guy. I don’t think anybody can, dev that.

And at this point, is a you know, pretty experienced, political leader. But I think both on Russia, Ukraine, and now on Israel Gaza, There’s just an enormous amount of zigzagging, and it’s it’s somewhat baffling to me. Could you and and perhaps to others as well. Could you explain it?

Okay. I’ll do it as best as I can. First of all, he is a very smart person. But, I’m going to give you to reveal to you and to your to your, audience, the name of the most important advisor to Macron on the issues you talked about. His name is Emmanuel Macron.

So, basically, Macron only listens to himself. So don’t look for hidden influences He’s his own person. He’s smart, but he also believes he’s extremely smart, so does not really need any advisors. And frankly, I can tell you that the people around him, some of them are, on my friends, are literally sometimes banging their heads on the wall because Once again, the president has now followed the, you know, what’s what had been prepared with him, not only for him, but for him. So look, he’s his own man.

He improvises a lot. He doesn’t like being told what to do. And I think he is the quintessential macro policy on many on many issues domestic and international is to walk a fine line between two different sides of an argument on Ukraine and Gaza, the two two very different things. It’s two very different thing. On Ukraine, I think he genuinely thought for a long time that he had a role to play it that France had a specific role to play because of our imagined spatial relationship was Russia, in trying to prevent the Ukraine war.

And it took him a while to realize that Putin had fooled him. Right. Putin took him as a at his game. Macron is very good at seducing people. He took him a while before realizing that put in a state to taking him this home game.

You know, at some point, he said, well, he lied to me duh. Yes. That’s what Putin does, you know, but no one should, doubt his commitment now. To supporting Ukraine, especially that he has realized that support to Ukraine integration of upgrading to Western institutions. The EU and NATO is an important feature of his own European agenda.

So in his own interests also, not only because of our values and interests, he’s he does support screen. So he’s fallen on the right side of history. What you say. On Gaza, it’s a complex. It’s a much more complex issues, issue.

He has been remember, this is a guy that in twenty eighteen welcomed Netanyahu in Paris and called him BB. You know, you know, this is not what your quintessential fresh fresh president does. But he has a, you know, he has something for bad peep bad guys, you know, if I may say so, you know, he likes he used to say during the campaign, twenty sixty in twenty seventeen, I like to buy a stock when it’s low. So he did with at the time. What he owes or or was also trying to do with Donald Trump.

Anyway, fast forward to, today. I think he’s genuinely committed to his, you know, to the evidence that Israel has the right to self defend, has the right to defend itself. But when he when, when he sees the images and terrible human toll of the operations, Gaza, he’s aware of two things that the risk of ex escalation and unwanted effects of this war actually, or become, impossible to, to control. And he is also taking another hat, which is France as a mediating power, someone who can talk to pretty much everyone in the in the region, which is true. Actually, this is the first time in a long time that we can actually, as France, have a, you know, a direct dialogue in connection with Israel with the gulf countries and with several other European air.

Sorry, with several, important Arab states. So I think I understand what he’s trying to do The problem is that once again, his public expression is a way to lose the way he talked to the BBC about, you know, civilians, dead civilians, and garden, babies, and grandmothers. That was not the sort of states person’s language. That one should have at this point, which is given the gravity of the events, being very cautious about the kind of words you use and the kind of circumstances you use them.

So Bruno, you know, Emmanuel Macron famously said a couple of years ago, during the Trump years that NATO was brain dead. And because you are quite expert on alliances, has have written a lot about them and have, you know, talked about them, in this podcast, What is what do you think the French assessment is of, you know, NATO today? It seems to have I mean, have been revivified by the, conflict in Ukraine and seems to be operating, you know, reasonably well, I think.

And, actually, if I could just build on that, sort of, to revise and extend, Eric’s, remarks, You know, it’s been very interesting to watch the evolution of French policy towards NATO from, you know, the gaullist position on it to Sarkozy, you know, really essentially reentering the military alliance. And, you know, is is that something we should expect to continue. I mean, is there a, well, let me backtrack a bit. I I think sometimes people think that there’s an enormous amount of continuity in French foreign policy, despite the move from president to president, do do you believe that’s the case? So I think we’re I’d like to draw you out on that one as well.

Overall, the answer is yes, Elliot. Likewise, I mean, I think people from the on the outside, underestimate the amount of continuity that exists, for instance, in US, foreign policy in many, in many respects, So that is true. But I think what important distinction, to make, to answer your question, is to differentiate between Macron and the establishment, so to say. That is that the, the French political military establishment. Look, my deep seated conviction is that Macron has no affection for the US and for NATO.

He’s not a guy. You know, people get it wrong because they say, His work was the international finance. Is he say he’s a young, modern man. No, they get it wrong. He’s a very old school person.

And I think he’s probably marked my words. The least pro American of our presidents since, since pompidou. I think so. So he accept the existence of NATO. He is very honest when he Sarah Longwell with, you know, others, you know, will defend each and every square inch or square centimeter of NATO Terry.

I think he’s honest and sincere, but he’s not, you know, he doesn’t get emotional when he talks about the Atlantic Alliance. And by the way, it’s it’s okay as far as I’m concerned as long as he’s faithful to the basic commitments of the NATO. Alliance. He realizes he regrets, but realizes that most of our European partners are very attached Nato and don’t want to consider any alternative, by the way, he’s not asking them to consider alternatives. Now the problem is that, twenty twenty three is very close to twenty twenty four, and you will hear increasingly people in France say, it may very well turn out that after decades of being wrong, we will actually be right.

That is the US will leave Europe eventually. I used to say that there were three incorrect, three false narratives in Europe. One was the French narrative, which for decades has been the US will eventually leave Europe. The other one was the reverse one, the German one, the US will always be there. And the third false narrative was what I call the Polish narrative.

It doesn’t matter. As long as the US troops are there, we’re fine. So there are I think these three narratives can be challenged However, I mean, it’s it’s not it’s not unrealistic to imagine a US president in January twenty twenty five tweeting or exiting, posting something along the lines of, I no longer want the US to fulfill its defense commitment with the alliance. I I half jokingly say that, you know, it takes a tweet to break the alliance, not to break data, but the alliance in terms of this ex extraordinary tool of deterrence. Because when Russia and other adversaries of the West will see a US president openly renegade on on reneging on its commitments, for mutual defense, then, you know, whatever unit whatever US unit you have on your territory begins to be highly devalued.

So that’s a very long way to say that I think the French in general are very much and very concretely attached to NATO. We You know, we take initiatives. We have taken this initiative of having a NATO presence in Romania, That was a French, you know, that was a French idea, and we’re there. We are, you know, active participants in exercises and nuclear deterrents, of course, So there’s no reason to challenge the French commitment to the alliance and to article five in particular But there are reasons to believe that Macron himself does not celebrate every night and every morning the shared values and the and the ideals of the transonic partnership. That’s the way I would put it.

Bruno, we’re running low on time, and we don’t wanna attain you too much longer, but your last comments I think lead very nicely to where I wanted to end our conversation today, which is, you have been a longtime observer of the United States, among other things. And, you were talking about the potential, quite obviously of a a second Trump presidency, and what that might mean for for the alliance, and for deterrence implicitly. How does the current moment of very dysfunctional American politics you know, look to you and and look to a European audience. You know, my former boss, Bob Gates, had a an article in foreign affairs, a couple of weeks ago called the dysfunctional superpower. We we hope to have him on actually shield of the republic soon.

To talk about that article, but in it, he basically said that, you know, the United, it’s sort of the old pogo, you know, comic strip. You know, we have we have found the enemy and it is us that, you know, the biggest challenge to the west and this, you know, new geopolitical realm that you’ve been describing and talking about is the willingness of the United States to continue to, as John Kennedy once said, pay any price bear any burden and continue to be the leader of this you know, family of nations.

Look, it’s very easy for a European, especially for a French man to lecture the United States I’m going to refrain from doing that and say two things.

Thank you.

First of all, seasoned observers, and I believe that I’m, reaching the age where I can qualify as one, have heard every ten years or so, worries on, about the temptation in the US to refrain from adventurism abroad to focus on, healing the wounds at home, etcetera, etcetera, especially refrain from intervening in the Middle East, but the Middle East has the bad habit of, you know, remaining itself of its presence. I often joke about, maybe Eric or idiot. I’ve heard me say that, but Each and every incoming US president should have a plaque in the Oval Office saying you might not be interested in Middle East, but the Middle East will be interested in you. So, cautiously optimistic because I remain fascinated by the willingness and ability of the United States, even with all its travails and problems to immediately react and be up to the challenge when, when it’s needed. And I have I have to say that, adversaries of the West, in particular, adversaries, enemies of the United States, always underestimate it at their own peril.

Look, who would have predicted that I didn’t count the number ships and, and horsepower, which is present in Meliza, who would have predicted that a, that Joseph Biden would project so quickly so much American, sea and air power in the region after October the the seventh. You know, so I think this is reassuring in a sense because for all the problems and and and, you know, and and, and dysfunctions of the US system. It’s also one of the most stable political systems in recent, world history. So, you know, I’m cautiously optimistic. Because I’ve seen too many bad bets on European power on on the US power over the past thirty years.

And that’s bad. I’m not ready to make. I’m, the safe bet today is the continuation of the US ability and most of the time willingness to exercise its responsibility throughout the world when it’s needed. That’s a safe bet for me.

Well, that’s reassuring. Thank you, Bruno.

It does take a foreigner from time to time. To, to cheer you up. It happens in my country too. Yeah.

I was gonna say that this is an uncharacteristically cheerful and optimistic note on which to end an episode of shield of the Republic, which normally is a a font of doom and gloom about the future of the international order. Our our guest today has been Bruno Tepey, one of France’s leading voices on international affairs. Bruno, thank you so much for joining us. We hope to have you back with us. Either beaming in from Paris or on one of your occasional visits, stateside.

And and I think both Elliot and I hope, to see you in Paris at some point.

Absolutely. Thank you for hosting me.