The Russian military isn't really set up to conduct the same type of war that the US military is. Part of the reason for that is that it is set up along the lines of the Soviet military--which was intended for two uses:
1) A war against NATO forces;
2) Suppression of revolt inside the Soviet empire (including their Warsaw Pact "allies.").
The Russian military isn't really set up to conduct the same type of war that the US military is. Part of the reason for that is that it is set up along the lines of the Soviet military--which was intended for two uses:
1) A war against NATO forces;
2) Suppression of revolt inside the Soviet empire (including their Warsaw Pact "allies.").
Condition #1 sort of dictated both the TO&E (table of organization and equipment) of the units and the force structure. One of the primary factors in this appears to be the general assumption on the part of the Soviets (later Russians) that they would not have air superiority (in fact the reverse).
This accounts for the large number of AAD systems in the Soviet army that had no American equivalents (like the ZSU23-4). No really effective equivalents of AWACs or Joint Stars (or whatever they are calling it these days)...and LOTS of artillery.
The Russians apparently also suck at SEAD (suppression of enemy air defenses), which has been developed into a fine art by the American Air Forces (one of the reasons for the American early adoption of stealth and why we basically lead the world in it).
Air/ground interoperations also seem poor... something else that has been hugely refined by the Americans.
Given their force composition, the only real option for the Russians WRT urban combat is the old shell the place into oblivion approach--which sometimes works and sometimes doesn't.
Destroying a city actually makes it more defendable.
If you have a decent logistics train (oops, sorry Russia) it isn't really necessary to take a city--as pointed out, you generally had to wreck the place to take it and you had to expend a lot of logistics and manpower to do that.
Taking a city is more of a political objective than a military objective... which is why there is a certain fixation about it on the part of the leadership.
Getting bogged down in urban warfare is a big no-no (from a military perspective)--especially if you are armor-heavy (because armor is kind of useless in that type of warfare).
Russian military strategy appears to be primarily driven by the political objectives of Putin. While the overall political strategy should be guiding operations , there is a difference between political and military objectives that causes some apparent stupidity to appear. What this generally means is that the political leadership is micromanaging.
Given modern technologies, the capability of modern logistics (at least on the American side), and the nature of contemporary high intensity warfare as being mostly about fighting with what you already have on hand (because there isn't time to build stuff or train new people), most of the historical rationales for taking cities have essentially disappeared, other than the political rationales.
We regularly fight wars on the other side of the globe. The last time the Russians did that was essentially WW2--in the Soviet Far East versus Japan. They had MASSIVE American logistical support for that.
Thank you for the explanation. I don't believe the Ukrainians can accept any peace agreement that allows Russia to keep any territory it has taken. Whatever Putin agrees to today, he will find an excuse to break tomorrow. Today either we, the West, drive him back to Russia, or we will pay the price tomorrow. If he gets to keep any territory, he will use it as a victory in his propaganda war. He has supporters in America as well as in Europe. We are looking at Europe in 1936 when Churchill was warning everyone about Nazi Germany. I realize the comparison is not a one-to-one, but there are enough similarities that should make us very wary of the immediate future.
The Russian military isn't really set up to conduct the same type of war that the US military is. Part of the reason for that is that it is set up along the lines of the Soviet military--which was intended for two uses:
1) A war against NATO forces;
2) Suppression of revolt inside the Soviet empire (including their Warsaw Pact "allies.").
Condition #1 sort of dictated both the TO&E (table of organization and equipment) of the units and the force structure. One of the primary factors in this appears to be the general assumption on the part of the Soviets (later Russians) that they would not have air superiority (in fact the reverse).
This accounts for the large number of AAD systems in the Soviet army that had no American equivalents (like the ZSU23-4). No really effective equivalents of AWACs or Joint Stars (or whatever they are calling it these days)...and LOTS of artillery.
The Russians apparently also suck at SEAD (suppression of enemy air defenses), which has been developed into a fine art by the American Air Forces (one of the reasons for the American early adoption of stealth and why we basically lead the world in it).
Air/ground interoperations also seem poor... something else that has been hugely refined by the Americans.
Given their force composition, the only real option for the Russians WRT urban combat is the old shell the place into oblivion approach--which sometimes works and sometimes doesn't.
Destroying a city actually makes it more defendable.
If you have a decent logistics train (oops, sorry Russia) it isn't really necessary to take a city--as pointed out, you generally had to wreck the place to take it and you had to expend a lot of logistics and manpower to do that.
Taking a city is more of a political objective than a military objective... which is why there is a certain fixation about it on the part of the leadership.
Getting bogged down in urban warfare is a big no-no (from a military perspective)--especially if you are armor-heavy (because armor is kind of useless in that type of warfare).
Russian military strategy appears to be primarily driven by the political objectives of Putin. While the overall political strategy should be guiding operations , there is a difference between political and military objectives that causes some apparent stupidity to appear. What this generally means is that the political leadership is micromanaging.
Given modern technologies, the capability of modern logistics (at least on the American side), and the nature of contemporary high intensity warfare as being mostly about fighting with what you already have on hand (because there isn't time to build stuff or train new people), most of the historical rationales for taking cities have essentially disappeared, other than the political rationales.
We regularly fight wars on the other side of the globe. The last time the Russians did that was essentially WW2--in the Soviet Far East versus Japan. They had MASSIVE American logistical support for that.
Thank you for the explanation. I don't believe the Ukrainians can accept any peace agreement that allows Russia to keep any territory it has taken. Whatever Putin agrees to today, he will find an excuse to break tomorrow. Today either we, the West, drive him back to Russia, or we will pay the price tomorrow. If he gets to keep any territory, he will use it as a victory in his propaganda war. He has supporters in America as well as in Europe. We are looking at Europe in 1936 when Churchill was warning everyone about Nazi Germany. I realize the comparison is not a one-to-one, but there are enough similarities that should make us very wary of the immediate future.