
The Hard Calls Dems Must Make to Regain Power
Democrats want to win over more moderate voters. But are they willing to adopt moderate positions?

The ācode talkā for white guys party
There is a grim reality facing Democrats amid the hoopla about eye-popping victories in special elections and Donald Trumpās falling approval rating.
The Senate map is an absolute disaster for them. Donāt take my word for it: During an hour-long conversation at Harvard University last month, Tim Walz said he was āpessimisticā about the partyās chances to win back the chamber.
You donāt usually hear that type of open pessimism from top officials. But Walz got even more candid from there. He said that the national party had become so toxic that it dragged down Sen. Jon Testerās re-election bid in 2024āto the point that Tester, a close friend, asked him not even to call during election season.
But what stood out for me beyond Walzās dark assessment was how little he had to say about what āchangeā for Democrats should look like. In fact, he seemed relatively content with the status quo. Walz said the Democratic partyās policies āare goodā and defended DEI initiatives. He summed up the partyās problems as mostly a matter of messaging. He encapsulated his view of national politics as a contest of superficial branding when he explained why Kamala Harris chose him as her running mate.
āI was on the ticket, quite honestly, ācause I could code-talk to white guys watching football fixing their truck,ā he said. āI could put them at ease. I was the permission structure to say, āLook, you can do this and vote for this.āā
Such a remark certainly says a lot about Walz himself. But it also underscored something bigger: The party faces a dilemma around its future, but Democrats and their allied groups and policy apparatus remain deeply uncomfortable confronting it. If they donāt soon, it might not be just the Senate thatās at risk.
There is near-universal agreement among Democrats that the party needs to expand its tent and appeal to more moderate and independent voters. Whatās far less clear is what exactly they are willing to do to make the Democratic label more palatable to those types of voters.
Under the Walz vision, the party doesnāt need to stake out more moderate cultural or policy positions. Rather, Democrats can get the job done if they put a candidate in a Carhartt jacket and get them to speak somewhat fluently about college football on a podcast with Theo Von.
Itās hard not to see the shortcomings of this approach. Walz embodied them, but his inclusion on the Harris ticket did little to stop the bleeding with white male voters. Yes, he may have been boxed in by an overcautious campaign structure. But when he was sent out there as the meat-eating, football-loving neighborhood dad, he had his flubs (pick-six, anyone?).
And thatās to be expected. After all, running candidates who look the part of purple and red America isnāt a panacea. Voters know when theyāre being pandered to, and they donāt always like it.
Another option is to simply bank on voters being so turned off by Trump that they turn to you. This may have worked in certain contexts. But the record is fairly mixed. Ask Mitt Romney if Trumpās toxic politics eventually ruined him. Ask Barack Obama if the Republican āfeverā ever broke.
And yet, if you survey Democrats now, these appear to be the predominant tactics the party is relying on to win back control of Congress. Thermostatic politics may work in the short term. But the fear in some quarters is that the thermostat wonāt help if the house is on fire.
āThis is hilariously stupid. If youāre trying to pick up moderate voters, the way to do it is to *be* more moderate. Drinking beer and driving trucks arenāt substitutes,ā Lakshya Jain, cofounder and CEO of the election data analysis firm Split Ticket, wrote in response to Walzās comments.
āVoters donāt care about candidate identity as much as Democrats insist they do.ā
THE GOOD NEWS FOR DEMOCRATS is that now theyāre at least engaging in this debate. Substacker Matt Yglesias has been, perhaps, the most vocal combatant in it. He has dubbed the phenomenon going on in the Democratic party ādog-whistle moderationāātalking a lot about moderating without actually changing any policy preferences. He noted that leaders like Sen. Chris Murphy (D-Conn.) have no problem going on cable news or late-night shows and arguing that the party should be ālaser focused on winning elections instead of political purity.ā But they arenāt practicing what they preach.
At the end of April, Murphy, along with Rep. Adam Schiff (D-Calif.), reintroduced the assault-weapons ban. āYou know and I know, and Chris Murphy knows and Adam Schiff knows, that talking about an assault weapons ban does not help Democratic candidates win steep uphill Senate battles in Texas and Iowa and Ohio,ā Yglesias argued. Gun-safety groups will argue that politics today is very different from politics in 1994, when many commentators blamed the assault-weapons ban for Democrats getting crushed that cycle (in what itself may have been an apocryphal reading of the results). But, then again, no ban is going to pass in the current GOP-run Congress, let alone be enacted while Trump is president. What will happen is Democrats running in red states and districts will be put on the spot.
All of this raises a larger question: What policies, if any, is the party prepared to sacrifice, or at least put off to the side? Thatās been an uncomfortable exercise for Democrats, in part because Democratic-aligned interest groups genuinely believe (and can produce their own data to argue) that their pet projects do poll well and can energize voters.
Some party operatives have tried to warn candidates that āthe groupsā are self-serving; that as the midterms inch closer, the party will inevitably have to make hard tradeoffs if it wishes to deliver meaningful wins. The question is whether the candidates themselves have the stomach for it.
ONE OF THOSE OPERATIVES ISSUING WARNINGS is Stef Feldman, a senior aide in the Biden White House and the policy director on his 2020 campaign. In a Substack post last week, Feldman encouraged candidates to ānot be afraid to tell interests groups, voters, or your political advisors āno.āā She said that sometimes the best thing to do is to not say anything at all. During the 2020 primary, for example, Joe Biden declined to fill out the now-infamous ACLU questionnaire that led to the āthey/themā attack ad against Kamala Harris.
Feldman is one of the partyās more reserved power brokers, only irregularly putting herself out in the press. So the decision to pen that post suggests that she is worried about the Democratsā inability to make the hard choices that, in her estimation, they need to make.
A slightly more outgoing Democrat is making similar points. Rahm Emanuel, who is reportedly considering running for president in 2028, has spent weeks warning Democrats that itās risky to focus just on an economic agenda while ignoring thornier subjects such as crime and immigration. In an op-ed for the Washington Post in February, Emanuel argued that voters were open to Bill Clinton and Barack Obama because they ātook stances that were in the mainstream of political sentiment, and both were willing to confront allied interest groups demanding fidelity and orthodoxy to out-of-touch positions.ā
Of course, itās one thing to make these arguments in a Substack post or from the safety of an op-ed page. When actual Democratic lawmakers have tried doing so, itās proven . . . dicey.
After California Gov. Gavin Newsom said earlier this year that Democrats were wrong for supporting transgender athletesā participation in womenās college and youth sports, I heard from a number of Democratic strategists and operatives who were appalled. Their criticism went something like this: We donāt win by throwing vulnerable people under the bus! Why punch down on the very people weāre trying to protect?
Itās hard to argue with that moral sentiment. But ultimately, the debate before Democrats is about not just ethics but politics. And itās worth asking what it means to āprotectā trans kids (or asylum seekers, or abortion access, or the environment, or affordable health care, etc.) if youāre losing elections.
Making sure that the national party brand is palatable enough that such Democrats as Jon Tester and Claire McCaskill can hold their Senate seats is probably a crucial element to achieving those stated goals. Can those types of lawmakers win those types of races if the party is going on offense about trans issues? Perhaps. But itās a risky proposition. The problem is that the party doesnāt seem to be fully grappling with that risk.
š« Donkey Business:
ā In an appearance on ABCās The View this week, Joe Biden said he takes āresponsibilityā for Donald Trumpās return to powerāan important admission as the Democratic party tries to heal from 2024. But in the same interview, Biden said that he still thinks he would have beaten Trump if he had stayed in the race. Jill Biden, who was also on set for the interview, took a swipe at their āso called friendsā in the party who were instrumental in forcing him to step down.
As Puckās Dylan Byers wrote this week, the Biden team is anxiously awaiting the release on May 20 of Original Sin, the much-hyped book by CNNās Jake Tapper and Axiosās Alex Thompson about Bidenās cognitive decline and how the White House tried to keep it from the public. The appearance on The View was partially an attempt to do some preemptive damage control.
Some former Biden aides told me they were happy to see the president getting back out there. But the predominant response from Democrats has been: please stop.
āItās time for Joe Biden to go away with all due respect and let the next generation of Democrats take the mantle,ā Democratic strategist Chuck Rocha told Politicoās Brakkton Booker. āEvery time he appears on a show or says something, itās just another week or a month that we have to defend him and remind everybody that we got beat by Donald Trump, again.ā
My open tabs:
ā Florida Democrats are falling apart.
ā The secret tennis court of Vatican City and the Pope who loves to play.
Ugh, I hate this. Because every debate about what the Democratic party should or should not do ignores that the problem is NOT the policies, it's the voters.
For three elections now, we've had the same problem. 'We have to moderate our positions to win middle America!' And while covid dragged Biden over the finish line, the reality is that When Harris and Clinton did exactly that, Trump won. Why? Because liberals did not come out for them.
The Newsom and Emanuel position looks like this: 'liberals have nowhere to go. They have to either choose between us or republicans, so we can do whatever we want and they'll have to vote for us.'
Except no, they won't. As we've seen, several times now, liberals do not come out to vote for candidates who do not want to represent them. We can say 'we need to win white america or blue collar America' but if you win those places and you lose liberals, you still won't win.
So the core problem is that the Democratic party's voters are a separate breed from the Democratic party writ large. This isn't that unlike what happened to the GOP that let the tea party and then Trump take over. One should remember that the Tea party left the GOP in the wilderness for six years, basically.
So you CAN tell Democratic voters no, but that is an interesting approach when you also need their votes. This is the truth of the Democratic party; why did Biden get the nod in 2020? Because he won South Carolina. Why did winning there matter? Because he won black voters. Why does that matter? Because no Democrat can win nationwide if you don't carry black voters, full stop.
If the GOP is a monolith, the Democratic party is different groups that all hate each other. Even so, there are three groups that you must win: Southern black voters, educated white professionals, union labor. You must win all three. If you lose any of them, the GOP wins, full stop.
And the problem is, those educated white professionals are VERY liberal. They tend to be the ones voting for Sanders and Warren. Black voters are more conservative socially, but more economically liberal. And union labor are conservative economically and liberally compared to the others.
So yeah, Newsom may want to fight wokeness and throw trans people under the bus to win those blue color white voters. But congrats, you lose educated professionals, and that means you lose.
Also, it's worth noting that the last party to be told that they needed to reverse course was the GOP after Romney, they doubled down, and won. So perhaps the strategy isn't to throw your own voters under the bus but to instead galvanize them with some outside force? It's now worked for MAGA for three elections, not counting Trump's handling of covid, which apparently wasn't a dealbreaker to make him president again for most voters.
In any case, mathematically and conceptually, the Newsom and Emanuel strategy is a failure on its face. There's a reason why one of them got sent to Japan so that no one had to see him or talk to him anymore.
I completely disagree with this āletās be wishy-washy, middle of the roadā approach. I think we need to be bravely progressive, and in particular to support those who are being targeted by the Republicans in leadership right now. Yes, we need to create a big tent, but we donāt need to throw selected groups under the bus to get there.