How Democrats Can Have a Better Conversation About Israel
It starts with asking better questions.
WE HAVE REACHED THE FEEDING-FRENZY stage of the Democratic party’s relationship with Israel.
On April 15, forty Senate Democrats—including all reportedly considering 2028 presidential runs—voted to block a weapons transfer to Israel. Some said they would never support such transfers again. Proposals are proliferating to end U.S. military assistance to Israel when the current ten-year, $38 billion agreement expires in 2028. Months after a debate arose about treating so-called “offensive” weapons like aerial bombs differently from “defensive” weapons like Iron Dome, increasing numbers of Democrats now argue against supporting aid of any kind. Some say Israel can buy what it needs. Others even say selling weapons to Israel should be prohibited altogether. Senate candidates are uncritically engaging with Hasan Piker, a streamer who calls Hamas “a thousand times better than Israel,” among a litany of bigoted and cruel statements. Viral Harry Enten clips document how the bottom has dropped out of favorable attitudes toward Israel among Democrats.
In this environment, legitimate criticism of Israel (for which there is ample room), and nuanced debate about policy options compete for oxygen with Israel-haters constantly trying to one-up each other. That’s hardly a healthy Democratic policy debate.
Let’s restore some order to this discussion, starting with a few basic facts and premises, and keeping in mind that the “Israel can do no right” arguments are as false as “Israel can do no wrong.”
Some things have changed about Israel in the past decade or so, and some have not.
There is justice in Israel’s existence as a state that provides self-determination for the Jewish people in their historic homeland. Centuries of statelessness and the tragedies of Jewish history, culminating in the Holocaust, underscore the need for a Jewish state.
Israel has long served as a reliable, democratic ally to the United States in a volatile and strategically important region. In earlier periods, its governments made genuine efforts to achieve peace with its neighbors, including the Palestinians. Most younger Americans have no experience with that Israel.
The governments that Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has led since 2009 have moved increasingly rightward, from skepticism of peace with the Palestinians to outright opposition to any vision of two states. The current government is dominated by racist and extremist ministers whose primary agenda is settlement expansion, prevention of a Palestinian state, and annexation of the West Bank. They ignore, and even facilitate, the wave of terrorism by Israeli extremists against Palestinian civilians in the West Bank.
Past negotiations failed not only due to Israeli intransigence, but also due to Palestinian rejection of Israel’s legitimacy in any borders, weak Palestinian leadership, and Palestinian terrorism, especially that perpetrated by Hamas.
The mass atrocities of the October 7th attacks were a trauma that hardened even the parts of Israeli society that supported two states. They fear a recurrence of that horrific day and are determined to prevent it.
An Israeli campaign against Hamas in Gaza was legitimate. But the war was conducted with much too little effort to protect innocent Palestinian civilians caught in the fighting, and far too many were killed. Israel was not sufficiently committed to ensuring adequate humanitarian assistance reached those in need. Israelis, in their trauma, and in their justifiable accusations that Hamas used Palestinian civilians as human shields, were unable to perceive or care that much of the world, including many friends of Israel in the United States, could not support Israel’s actions beyond a certain point.
As providers of military assistance to Israel, many Americans were appalled that their tax dollars were supporting the weapons that killed so many civilians.
U.S. assistance also supported Israel’s defense against Hezbollah, the Houthis, and Iran, enemies sworn to Israel’s destruction who attacked it unprovoked. Israeli reprisals there caused far fewer civilian casualties than in Gaza, and far less outcry in the United States.
Netanyahu has no reservoir of goodwill after the partisan way he has treated the American–Israeli relationship, working exclusively with Republicans and Donald Trump and frequently against Democrats.
The United States provides Israel with assistance, as it does to other countries, to advance American interests. But the United States has every right to leverage its assistance to try to shape Israeli action and behavior and ensure better outcomes, consistent with U.S. law and values. Neither President Biden nor President Trump has used the leverage effectively.
Some Israelis actually want to be free of U.S. assistance, which they feel constrains their military operations, stifles their defense industry, and subjects them to American dictates. Netanyahu has even hinted at this view. Many in the Israeli security establishment want U.S. aid to continue. Reportedly on the table beyond the current aid agreement is a negotiated phase-out of some U.S. assistance, to be replaced by increased Israeli self-reliance, commercial sales of some U.S. equipment, and expanded joint technology development and co-production.
Netanyahu advocated for the United States to join Israel in a war with Iran, as he has with numerous presidents. Trump bears responsibility for the decision to go to war, which was ill-conceived and is going poorly.
The combined U.S.–Israeli campaign against Iran has been an impressive example of the operational benefits of two militaries fighting together, which has strategic benefits, even if poor planning by the Trump administration means they are outweighed by the costs.
Instead of rushing at breakneck speed toward a complete dismantling of the U.S.–Israel partnership, Democrats should take the time to have a serious debate.
First, Democrats should be clear about whether they support Israel’s existence as a Jewish state. Some in the marginal zone near the edge of the Democratic coalition oppose the existence of the Jewish state. They call Israel, for example, a “fascist settler colonial apartheid state.” Their proposals are not about a policy adjustment, but about turning the United States into Israel’s adversary. That is not a recipe for peace.
While polling shows widespread disapproval of Israel’s behavior, I suspect most in the party don’t oppose Israel’s existence. But let’s be honest: If the no-compromise anti-Zionist view prevails, it will alienate many Jewish Americans and other key voters as we head into two must-win elections.
FOR THOSE WHO DO SUPPORT Israel’s existence as a Jewish state (an awfully low bar), we can then have a wide-ranging and legitimate debate. But in the rush to cut off assistance, many are starting with the wrong questions. Here is what we should be asking:
Does the U.S.–Israel partnership serve any U.S. interests? If so, how do we preserve and maximize the benefit, while minimizing the harm?
That might lead to a much more nuanced conversation about assistance. If having a partner who can effectively fight our common enemies in the Middle East is important, can we scope assistance programs to support that benefit? Why go to zero assistance when we could explore ways to provide what helps us, while agreeing on limitations, or using it as leverage, to stop what we oppose?
There are now conflicting proposals on the table. Some call for treating Israel “like every other country.” The United States sells arms to Saudi Arabia, Iraq, Egypt, and other countries with spotty human rights records, often with favorable financing deals. Would today’s calls to oppose military assistance to Israel simply transform into calls to oppose commercial weapons sales?
Others call for treating Israel more like our NATO allies or other close allies like Japan. Do we support signing a mutual defense treaty with Israel? Should we station thousands of American troops there? Should we set up U.S. military bases there?
In response to outrageous statements and actions by extremist Israeli politicians, or settlement expansion and settler violence, is cutting off assistance our only tool? Why not consider individual sanctions against those whose behavior harms our interests? And shouldn’t we leave room for sustaining our partnership if the bad actors are voted out of office, as could happen in the Israeli election due to be held by October?
How will Hamas, Iran, Hezbollah, and the Houthis respond to the end of U.S. assistance to Israel? Will it make them less likely to pursue their dreams of Israel’s destruction? Or will they feel emboldened? Would we be suppressing conflicts with this move, or fueling them?
And what about our friends? Would Arab and Muslim countries considering normalizing relations with Israel be more or less likely to do so if they see the United States pull away? Would Gulf nations still see the United States as their primary security partner as we distance ourselves from Israel? Will Congress continue to provide aid to Egypt and Jordan if it is no longer doing so for Israel? And if not, will those countries remain stable, committed to peace with Israel, and firmly in the American camp? Or are we opening the door to Russian and Chinese influence?
Finally, what is the case that ending the U.S.–Israel partnership will help achieve Palestinian statehood? If that is among our goals (as it should be), are we more likely to advance it in a cold, barely functional relationship with Israel, or in a partnership where we use our tools of leverage effectively?
Democrats should grapple with these questions, though none of them changes a truth for Israelis: They must understand that their own choices—the leaders they elect, the policies they adopt, the military tactics they use, the attitude they demonstrate toward the possibility of peace with their neighbors—are a crucial factor in shaping Americans’ views about the U.S.–Israel relationship. Just as Americans should take into account Israel’s legitimate security concerns and interests, Israelis should accept these realities of American politics. And they can decide whether or how much to prioritize preserving bilateral ties.
Different Democrats will answer many of these questions differently. Strong emotions push us toward an all-or-nothing conversation, but if we are a party committed to responsible policymaking, we owe it to ourselves and to the nation to pause and take the time and make the decision that appears to us to be in the United States’ best interests.




