Not to beat a dead horse-- or thread-- but the Russians now have a problem. You might want to read up on the narrow Allied thrust to Arnhem in WWII, which many call "A Bridge Too Far". There, the Allies dropped concentrations of airborne troops on important transportation centers and tried to link up with them along a single highway sur…
Not to beat a dead horse-- or thread-- but the Russians now have a problem. You might want to read up on the narrow Allied thrust to Arnhem in WWII, which many call "A Bridge Too Far". There, the Allies dropped concentrations of airborne troops on important transportation centers and tried to link up with them along a single highway surrounded by impassable terrain. It didn't work.
It seems to me the Russians have now made the same mistake. They look like they have tried to seize narrow corridors oriented along highways, following airborne attacks on airports and strategic intersections. In Russian military doctrine, soldiers on the offensive carry little food or fuel, expecting constant resupply from a secured rear. But in Ukraine, they did not protect their flanks or attempt to subdue surrounding terrain; they have no secure rear area. They lost the special forces which seized transportation hubs. And now they are losing supply convoys because they did not protect their flanks. Lost convoys mean lost trucks; supply vehicles are the single most important weapon system in Eastern Europe. Their armored spearheads are now almost stationary, suffering from lack of food and fuel.
Not to beat a dead horse-- or thread-- but the Russians now have a problem. You might want to read up on the narrow Allied thrust to Arnhem in WWII, which many call "A Bridge Too Far". There, the Allies dropped concentrations of airborne troops on important transportation centers and tried to link up with them along a single highway surrounded by impassable terrain. It didn't work.
It seems to me the Russians have now made the same mistake. They look like they have tried to seize narrow corridors oriented along highways, following airborne attacks on airports and strategic intersections. In Russian military doctrine, soldiers on the offensive carry little food or fuel, expecting constant resupply from a secured rear. But in Ukraine, they did not protect their flanks or attempt to subdue surrounding terrain; they have no secure rear area. They lost the special forces which seized transportation hubs. And now they are losing supply convoys because they did not protect their flanks. Lost convoys mean lost trucks; supply vehicles are the single most important weapon system in Eastern Europe. Their armored spearheads are now almost stationary, suffering from lack of food and fuel.