That’s a question for Eliot Cohen I’m afraid. I don’t work in NatSec anymore. It’s not like the Ivy League NatSec opinion crowd goes around asking guys like me for solutions or for what worked and what didn’t. These folks read books and draw their solutions from there. The large majority have never been in combat and couldn’t talk tactic…
That’s a question for Eliot Cohen I’m afraid. I don’t work in NatSec anymore. It’s not like the Ivy League NatSec opinion crowd goes around asking guys like me for solutions or for what worked and what didn’t. These folks read books and draw their solutions from there. The large majority have never been in combat and couldn’t talk tactics if their life depended on it. Big disconnect between what the Ivy Leaguers talk about at the strategic level and what *actually* happens at the tactical level. We don’t have many combat-experienced leaders/thinkers at the top of the “think chain” if you will, hence why strategic level policy is almost never quite capable of meeting demands on the ground. Too much disconnect between top & bottom.
That’s a question for Eliot Cohen I’m afraid. I don’t work in NatSec anymore. It’s not like the Ivy League NatSec opinion crowd goes around asking guys like me for solutions or for what worked and what didn’t. These folks read books and draw their solutions from there. The large majority have never been in combat and couldn’t talk tactics if their life depended on it. Big disconnect between what the Ivy Leaguers talk about at the strategic level and what *actually* happens at the tactical level. We don’t have many combat-experienced leaders/thinkers at the top of the “think chain” if you will, hence why strategic level policy is almost never quite capable of meeting demands on the ground. Too much disconnect between top & bottom.