The World Sees America Falling Apart
America’s adversaries and allies are preparing for a world in which the United States isn’t a major player.
“Will Sahib is America ok?”
That was the first text I read on January 7, 2021. I didn’t understand what it meant. I was in Afghanistan, a day ahead of the East Coast. At first, I thought the U.S. embassy in Kabul had been hit by a suicide bomber or shelled. But there were no texts from my boss or the embassy’s regional security officer.
I scanned through my Afghan phone and realized nearly all of my Afghan contacts had reached out. They were worried.
I turned on the television and watched in horror the dreadful scenes from the Capitol. Here I was, on the other side of the world, protecting America from attack, yet the seat and symbol of American democracy was under attack by its own citizens. I could hardly believe my eyes.
I didn’t know how to respond to the hundreds of texts I received. Finally, I wrote back a generic response to all of them.
“Yes. America is fine. I’m ok. We will talk later.”
Over the next week, I spent countless hours reassuring jittery Afghans that the United States was not on the verge of collapse. Most of my Afghan contacts had toured America or studied here. They knew this was unprecedented. Despite my efforts to soothe their concerns, they knew something had changed.
America’s enemies and adversaries immediately saw an opening and took full advantage. The Iranians, Chinese, Russians, and Pakistanis (who some confuse for our friends) began telling our Afghan allies that American democracy was in peril. According to many of my Afghan contacts, they all had the same talking point: American-style democracy did not bring stability but chaos.
After January 6th, it was hard for many of my Afghan contacts to argue. When I tried to nudge them toward transparency, pluralism, and human rights, many would suggest, “Perhaps America should work on their own problems, brother.” The damage had been done.
Our allies aren’t stupid. They’re often keener observers of our domestic policies than we are. Throughout my 1,500 days in Iraq and Afghanistan, I was constantly surprised at our counterparts’ trenchant analysis of America’s domestic politics and what it meant for them. In 2012, from the remote village in Kandahar where I was living, local elders noticed both Barack Obama and Mitt Romney saying they wanted to withdraw from Afghanistan. They took notice and opted not to support the Afghan government.
Our adversaries know that Donald Trump has at least a decent chance of winning in the fall. Perhaps this might boost defense spending from our NATO partners, as Trump’s allies like to brag about. But, while greater burden sharing in NATO is more than welcome, military spending is a poor barometer for the strength of the alliance. In this case, it doesn’t signal a stronger alliance but a weaker one. Trump’s anti-NATO rhetoric further boosts our adversaries’ narratives about American fecklessness and fickleness.
In the coming months, America’s adversaries will begin planning for Trump’s return. That is the prudent course of action. America’s allies will have to prepare for that possibility, too—and in some cases, they already are. Poland, ever fearful of being swallowed by Russia for a fifth time, briefly halted military aid to Ukraine last year, preferring to recapitalize its own military instead. The new Polish government has resumed arms shipments, but is keen to find ways to help Ukraine without leaving Poland unprotected. The subtext in all of this is that Polish governments of the right and center-left agree that the United States might not come to Poland’s defense if it’s attacked.
Congressional dithering is already hurting both battlefield conditions and morale in Ukraine, and a second Trump term would only make things worse.
Not all of America’s allies will prepare themselves to face America’s enemies alone. Some will accommodate themselves to a world run by authoritarians. For now, American allies and partners from India to Japan to Australia are working together more closely than ever to counter a rising China, but if the American backstop goes away, there’s no guarantee they’ll hang together.
In short, some damage is already done. Our diplomats and military personnel helping allies and partners around the world defend themselves and maintain peace and security are facing the same question I did three years ago:
Is America ok?
I don’t know how to answer that question—not to our allies and partners, not to my fellow citizens, and not to myself. The GOP’s neo-isolationist wing is on the ascendancy. The bipartisan consensus that has defended the liberal international order since World War II is breaking down.
Our adversaries may underestimate just how strong a hand they have. If China began a blockade of Taiwan tomorrow, who can be sure they wouldn’t control it fully—and dominate the Indo-Pacific—within three years? President Joe Biden has repeatedly promised to defend Taiwan with the American military if it came to that. Would Trump give that order? More likely, he would crow about what a genius Xi Jinping is.
As shaky and unstable as the world has looked recently, we are still living through the longest drought of great-power wars in history. The system that makes our peace and prosperity possible—the liberal international order created and supported by the United States—will be on the ballot in November, and for the foreseeable future. Our adversaries and our allies all know it.
That damage that has been done need not be permanent. Republicans can start undoing it by passing the aid bill for Ukraine, Israel, and Taiwan. In the short term, passing these aid bills is imperative and will demonstrate the strength of the GOP’s internationalist wing. But in the long run, it’s hard to foresee how this rump faction will prevail if Trump wins in November. For the onus will be on President Biden and his allies—including some in the Republican party—to explain the benefits of the liberal international order to Americans. Getting people to do the right thing is a pretty handy definition of leadership, and Americans used to be good at it.