We Should Already Be Planning for Iran’s Response
The fundamental question should be: What are we trying to accomplish?
“No one starts a war—or rather, no one in his right mind should do so—without first being clear in his mind what he intends to achieve by that war and how he intends to conduct it.” –Carl von Clausewitz
THERE’S A REASON THAT MILITARY PROFESSIONALS still teach, quote, and—most importantly—apply Clausewitz’s warning about clear goals. War is not simply a response or a signal. It’s a deliberate extension of policy, with cascading effects. And it demands a plan.
Which brings us to this moment.
The U.S. strike on Iranian nuclear and military facilities was not an isolated, one-off decision. It was a reinforcing action—one that followed months of sustained Israeli operations targeting Iran’s air force, air defense systems, and electronic warfare capabilities. Israel, facing escalating threats from Hezbollah and Iran’s proxies, had spent years degrading Tehran’s ability to retaliate for a strike on its nuclear program. In that sense, the American strike did not initiate the confrontation—it reinforced it.
For years, Israel has requested U.S. support to do what it could not do alone: strike Iran’s deeply buried or hardened nuclear sites. Multiple American administrations demurred. But now, an operational window aligned: Iran’s escalatory behavior crossed red lines, Israel had raised the odds such a strike could be successful, and the pressure for the United States to act had built.
I’ll admit: I was torn by our action.
Part of me remembered, all too clearly, the pain caused by Iranian malign influence during my time in Iraq. I remember the weapons supplied by Quds Force operatives, the shaped charges that tore through American armor, the disruption of the Iraqi march to representative government, and the funerals for soldiers in our unit who were killed by Iranian-backed militias. A part of me was glad to see Iran’s leadership pay a price.
But not this way.
Not through an impulsive action that appears to have bypassed deliberation, allied consultation, and comprehensive strategic planning. Not through a decision made in isolation rather than in coordination.
Wars unfold in a cycle of action, reaction, and counteraction. The United States is now included in that cycle.
Iran’s regime, bloodied but intact, will respond. Perhaps not immediately. Perhaps not directly. But they have spent decades building asymmetric capabilities: missiles, militias, and terror, reinforced with cyberattacks, proxy forces like the Houthis, maritime harassment, and information warfare.
Inside Iran, a fragile regime walks along a narrow ledge as it considers to how to respond. Its economy is reeling, its people—especially the younger generation—are increasingly defiant, and its leadership is aging and isolated. An external attack might rally nationalistic support. Or it might push the regime into further crisis. Either outcome carries danger for the region and beyond.
That’s why our contingency planning matters more after the first missile than before.
When I served on the joint staff in the Pentagon, our job was to manage and assess war plans across global theaters. These weren’t linear outlines. They were dynamic frameworks filled with branches and sequels. Branches are alternate paths dependent on how events unfold: What if Hezbollah opens a northern front against Israel? What if Russia sees an opportunity to act elsewhere? What if a Gulf state is dragged into the fray? Each branch demands a different response—military, diplomatic, or economic. Sequels anticipate what comes after the original operations, or when a branch develops. After the strike, what is Phase II? Reassurance? Escalation? Containment? De-escalation through diplomacy? No operation is complete until the planners have sketched the sequel—and aligned it with the true strategic end state.
To validate all this, the military often uses red-teaming—placing planners in the mindset of the adversary to probe assumptions and stress-test plans and their branches. A good red team might ask, What if Iran leverages this strike to frame the United States as the aggressor? What if it splits the international coalition? What if it escalates not to win, but to entangle us further? There are thousands more such questions.
This is how the military creates decision advantage. This is how it replaces gut instinct with professional foresight and thorough intelligence.
When war becomes an extension of politics, everyone must be involved. The Treasury and Commerce Departments must anticipate sanctions blowback, global market disruptions, and energy shockwaves. Homeland Security must raise alert levels and defend our borders. Cybersecurity agencies must harden our networks against Iranian retaliation. The intelligence community must monitor Iranian proxies from Beirut to Buenos Aires—not to mention the other rogue state on the verge of deploying nuclear weapons, North Korea. Were those players, and others, involved in the strategic deliberations and long-term planning before the Iran strike? Or since?
Many of those very institutions—through politicization, distraction, or deliberate erosion—are not fully focused today. Several key agencies have seen personnel cutbacks, leadership turnover, or an extreme focus on a political agenda over the last few months. This undermines coordination, agility, and trust.
War must serve a political aim. Which means it must be coordinated with diplomacy, economic policy, and public communication. Tactical wins amid strategic confusion are just a slow way to lose a war.
Even if the strike was brilliant and tactically sound, the nation must now address the escalation boundaries, the deterrence of future Iranian retaliation, the potential for realigning forces in anticipation of a multi-theater response, and preparing the American public for what comes next.
These are questions that are pondered and addressed prior to any military operation. Strategic risk doesn’t disappear when the first missile hits its mark.
Every military plan concludes with a risk assessment. It doesn’t ask: Can we succeed? It asks: What happens if the enemy doesn’t respond as expected? What happens if public or political support evaporates? And most importantly: What can we do now to mitigate those risks and others that we might not expect?
Sending America’s sons and daughters into harm’s way is a sacred responsibility. It must be grounded in purpose, preparation, and the humility to anticipate the unexpected.
We’ve taken the first action. Iran will react. We must now prepare for the counteraction—our own.
And it better be smart.
 | A guest post by
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