All of that is true. Still, as a militarily sophisticated Israeli commented to me, there was method to the Hamas madness. Their brutal tactics and torture were intended to evoke the reaction of the Israelis. Under the wisest of governments, Israeli politicians would have had a hard time taking a more strategic approach (which I'll descri…
All of that is true. Still, as a militarily sophisticated Israeli commented to me, there was method to the Hamas madness. Their brutal tactics and torture were intended to evoke the reaction of the Israelis. Under the wisest of governments, Israeli politicians would have had a hard time taking a more strategic approach (which I'll describe below). But with the present government, the response was virtually guaranteed. The losses of civilians in Gaza is a feature, not a bug for the attack. The reasons that Hamas wanted to reshuffle the decks are obvious, and they have.
Now imagine if the Israelis had been able to take a different path.
To start, still declaring an embargo on Gaza, but pointing out that a) Hamas, their government, has large stores of fuel, water and fuel which they could, if they wished, distribute to the general population, and b) that that the government of Gaza could end the embargo at anytime by returning the hostages. That would have had a much higher probability of extracting the hostages.
Second, to clearly state to the Gazans and the world, that Israel would ultimately punish every member of Hamas with Munich-style persistence. That it might take years, but it would be inexorable and non-negotiable. For whatever the current difficiencies of the Israel Intelligence and military, that the response to Munich has a psychological power and moral defensibility that would not give Hamass the picture of dead children that they value so much.
All of that is true. Still, as a militarily sophisticated Israeli commented to me, there was method to the Hamas madness. Their brutal tactics and torture were intended to evoke the reaction of the Israelis. Under the wisest of governments, Israeli politicians would have had a hard time taking a more strategic approach (which I'll describe below). But with the present government, the response was virtually guaranteed. The losses of civilians in Gaza is a feature, not a bug for the attack. The reasons that Hamas wanted to reshuffle the decks are obvious, and they have.
Now imagine if the Israelis had been able to take a different path.
To start, still declaring an embargo on Gaza, but pointing out that a) Hamas, their government, has large stores of fuel, water and fuel which they could, if they wished, distribute to the general population, and b) that that the government of Gaza could end the embargo at anytime by returning the hostages. That would have had a much higher probability of extracting the hostages.
Second, to clearly state to the Gazans and the world, that Israel would ultimately punish every member of Hamas with Munich-style persistence. That it might take years, but it would be inexorable and non-negotiable. For whatever the current difficiencies of the Israel Intelligence and military, that the response to Munich has a psychological power and moral defensibility that would not give Hamass the picture of dead children that they value so much.