Russia. It's Always Russia.
The Europeans are going to need their own nuclear deterrent. Here's how they might get it.
1. Spinach
Not going to lie: Yesterday’s newsletter about Palantir’s capture of the Army was one of the worst-performing Triads of the year. People were not into it. Didn’t click; didn’t like; didn’t comment. If you guys aren't interested in looking around the corner to learn about the private leviathan that's taking over our DOD, that's on you, I guess. But don't say I didn't warn you.
To be honest, the non-reaction yesterday left me pretty disappointed. So in retaliation, today I’m going deep on something even sexier: a new report about European nuclear deterrence.
Take that, you sickos 😘
The force-feeding of spinach will continue until morale improves.
Okay: So there’s a huge new report from the European think tank Bruegel examining the EU’s options on nuclear weapons now that the United States has cut the legs out from under NATO. This is the kind of serious endeavor you should print out. It gives the history and details of nuclear deterrence in a really accessible form. (The pdf is here.)
For our purposes, we’re going to skip to the end and talk about Europe’s possible pathways forward.
Extending the Franco-British nuclear umbrella.
This is the quickest and easiest solution, because it can be accomplished with words. If the French and the Brits update their stated policies and doctrines, they can create a nuclear umbrella for the entire continent.
It’s a small umbrella, because the Franco-British arsenal is of limited size. It’s not enough to be a realistic shield in a full exchange. Also, paradoxically, the Franco-British arsenal lacks the optionality of theater nukes—meaning that in the case of an exchange, they would have to be willing to start with high-yield devices instead of having the option of using a battlefield device to create an off-ramp in a crisis.1
But it’s something—and probably enough to bridge the gap to a permanent solution.
Europe expands the Franco-British nuclear arsenal.
In this scenario, some combination of European stakeholder nations would formalize an organization to fund the expansion of the French and British nuclear forces.
This is a politically attractive option because it utilizes existing command-and-control structures, while sharing the economic burden. Also attractive: It would prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons to new countries and reassure the French and the Brits, since they’d remain as the sword-holders.
In practice, this pathway would mean building more ballistic nuclear submarines (the French and British have eight of these boats between them) and adding a supply of smaller warheads to the arsenal.
The big problem: These new capabilities would be unlikely to come online until the early 2040s. And who knows what the strategic situation will look like by then.
Also: Would Germany be willing to be a junior partner in such an arrangement? Would Poland?
Absorbing the Franco-British deterrent into a new European organization.
In this scenario the European community essentially creates a new NATO, sans America, with England and France allowing their nuclear forces to come under control of this new entity.
Politically, this seems like a non-starter to me. Why would France and Britain agree to such a thing?
Europe builds its own submarine-based nuclear deterrent fleet to complement the Franco-British nuclear force.
Submarines come in two classes, conventional and nuclear powered. The French and British are capable of producing nuclear-powered subs; the rest of Europe can only manufacture conventional subs.2
For our purposes, the most important difference between the two is ordinance. Nuclear-powered subs can launch ballistic missiles with large ranges that can deliver nuclear payloads. Conventional subs can only launch cruise missiles, which have a limited-range and are relatively easier for anti-missile defenses to target.3
All of that said, the European nations would have two options here. They could purchase nuclear ballistic subs from the French and British; or they could outfit a conventional submarine force of their own making with nuclear-tipped cruise missiles.
Either way, the goal would be for this European sub force to complement and/or backstop existing Franco-British deterrents.4
2. The Money
How much does this all cost? A lot. But maybe not as much as you think? The report estimates that a limited European deterrent (option #4) would cost about €50 billion to purchase French nuclear ballistic submarines, €5 billion for missile procurement, and €5 billion in yearly management costs.
And that’s all independent of the costs of the warheads.
That’s real money. But to put it in perspective, Germany spent €72 billion on defense in 2024 and we’re talking about a group that would be led by them and would include Sweden, Poland, Italy, Spain, and possibly Turkey, Ukraine, and assorted other nations.
So yes: A European nuclear deterrent is pricey. But it’s not out of reach.
Also, if you think peace is expensive, you should check out the sticker price on war.
The United Nations estimates that rebuilding Ukraine will cost $486 billion. That’s if the war ended today. Outside aid to Ukraine during the war (primarily from Europe and the United States) has totaled €267 billion, so far.
All of that expense—not to mention the lives lost—could have been avoided if Ukraine existed under a credible nuclear deterrent.
3. Proliferation
So what are the Europeans supposed to do?
It seems pretty obvious that everything starts with #1. In the short term, the French and British will have to create new policies and doctrine that extends their own nuclear guarantees—independent of NATO—to the rest of Europe.
But that’s only a stop-gap. In the long run, it’ll have to be either #2 (the rest of Europe helps fund French and British nuclear expansion) or #4 (Europe then builds its own submarine force as a complementary deterrent).
It’s not clear which of those would be best. I’d like you guys to think this question through in the comments—hopefully after you’ve read the report.
Try to keep political feasibility in mind. There are lots of competing interests here and lots of unknowns. It is incredibly hard to make long-range strategic plans for a world that does not even exist yet. Because keep in mind: By the time any of these deterrents come online, we’ll have a post-Putin Russia—and absolutely no one knows what that looks like.5
But this is what nations have to do: Make long-term plans about an uncertain future based on incomplete information and constantly shifting variables.
America is no longer capable of such things because the American people do not want leaders who are capable of them.
From a strategic perspective, tactical nukes serve a dual purpose.
First, in a crisis, they allow you to respond along a gradient, without jumping directly from conventional weapons to high-yield nukes, thus creating an offramp for the combatants.
Second, the very existence of this optionality makes the threat of a nuclear response more credible—and thus increases the deterrent value of the entire nuclear arsenal.
In other words: Having tactical nukes makes it less likely that you’ll have to use any nukes—and also creates a safety release in the event that the nuclear seal is broken.
Which is why it’s a problem that the French and British have very few (if any) devices suitable for tactical use.
This could change, but it’s very expensive to stand up an entire industry just to build a handful of nuclear-powered boats.
Technically you could put ballistic missiles on a diesel-powered submarine—the Soviets did it—but then the sub has to surface periodically, which makes it easy to detect, which kinda defeats the purpose of having missiles on the sub in the first place.
Why the focus on subs? The report argues that, as a political matter, getting Europeans to allow land-based nuclear weapons is a heavy lift for a number of reasons: Starting with the fact that land-based weapons are targets and the geography of Western Europe is such close quarters that it would be impossible to have these targets far from population centers.
As Ben Parker observed,
Putin has and can have no successor. Like almost every Russian leader before him dating back to the Bolshevik Revolution, he has redefined the job of Russian leader according to his own personality, preferences, and situation. . . . When Putin goes—be it tomorrow or in 25 years—the world’s largest nuclear power will have to reinvent most of its political system. And that process is likely to be messy, contentious, and dangerous for both Russia and the world.
I read and commented yesterday! I ate my spinach! I want a goddamned COOKIE now.
I just came here to say that I didn't read yesterday's Triad because I knew how depressed it would make me and I wasn't prepared to deal with that. It is in my inbox for when I feel stronger.
Now, off to eat TODAY'S green vegetables.